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Background
This test was conducted as part of the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Independent Testing project. This project was established to help reduce the barriers to wind energy expansion by providing independent testing results for small wind turbines (SWT). In total, four turbines were tested at the National Wind Technology Center (NWTC) as a part of this project. Safety and function testing is one of up to five tests performed on the turbines, including power performance, duration, noise, and power-quality tests. The results of the testing provide the manufacturers with reports that can be used for small wind turbine certification.
The test equipment includes a Gaia-Wind 11-kW wind turbine mounted on an 18-m monopole tower. Gaia-Wind Ltd. manufactured the turbine in Denmark. The system was installed by the NWTC site operations group with guidance and assistance from Gaia-Wind.
Test Objective
The objective of this test was to:
• Verify whether the test turbine displays the behavior predicted in the design;
• Determine whether provisions relating to personnel safety are properly implemented; and
• Characterize the dynamic behavior of the wind turbine at rated wind speed and greater speeds.
The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) does not limit safety and function tests to features described in the wind turbine documentation, and NREL also inspects-possibly tests-and reports on features that are required by IEC 61400-2 and that might not be described in the wind turbine documentation. NREL conducted this test in accordance with Section 9.6 of the IEC standard, "Wind Turbines-Part 2: Design Requirements for Small Wind Turbines," IEC 61400-2, second edition, 2006-03.
Description of Test Turbine and Setup
The test turbine was a Gaia-Wind 11-kW wind turbine. This turbine is a downwind, twobladed, constant-speed, turbine with a rated power of 11-kW. Figure 1 shows the test turbine installed at the National Wind Technology Center. Table 1 provides the key descriptive information of the test turbine. The Gaia-Wind 11-kW wind turbine was installed at site 3.3b at the NWTC, which is located 8 miles south of Boulder, Colorado. The site's terrain primarily is flat with short vegetation.
The test site has prevailing wind bearing 292 degrees relative to true north. For measurements requiring highly accurate wind-speed data, NREL used data obtained when the wind direction was between 257 degrees true to 332 degrees true and 147 degrees true to 197 degrees true. In this measurement sector-which was established in accordance with IEC 61400-12-1-the influence of terrain and obstructions on the anemometer and turbine is slight. 
Instrumentation
The following parameters were measured in this test: wind speed, electrical power, rotor speed, and grid voltage. The rotor speed was calculated by measuring the frequency of an optically isolated signal from the proximity sensor on the turbine generator. An indication of turbine status was obtained by measuring the status of the relay that indicates whether the turbine's brake is on. The instruments used for these measurements are listed in Table 2 . The calibration sheets for the instruments used for this safety and function test are included in Appendix A. 
Procedure
Safety and function testing can involve some risk to personnel and to equipment. By incorporating appropriate controls into testing procedures, NREL endeavors to accomplish its tasks with minimal risk. This test report documents these controls in areas where they might have influenced the results obtained.
Control and Protection System Functions
The first part of the test procedure is assessing the control and protection system functions (listed below). The turbine's response is observed for each major response category (start-up, normal shutdown, emergency shutdown) in the list below. For the cases in which faults or other actions cause one of these major responses, NREL staff simulates the appropriate input and verifies that the control and protection system appropriately sensed the condition and provided an indication of the appropriate response. This procedure, for example, enables generator overcharge functions to be checked without exposing the turbine to multiple potentially damaging stops. In the list below, these items are designated by the term "behavior." 
Personnel Safety Provisions
The second part of the test procedure was to evaluate provisions for personnel safety. For the test turbine the following issues were reviewed.
1. Safety instructions a. Safety instructions must be available for everybody working or operating at the site or in the wind turbine.
b. Safety instructions must cover installation, operation, and maintenance activities.
2. Climbing facilities must be checked for proper assembly and full function. 
Results
Control and Protection System Functions
The turbine exhibited no unexpected or inherently unsafe behavior during this investigation; however, this does not mean that the turbine is safe under all conditions. NREL limited testing to investigation of single-fault failures and has not investigated failures of "safe life" components.
1
Power Control
If a second fault occurs during a critical event, unsafe results could occur. Neither NREL nor the IEC turbine-design requirements make judgments on whether such failures are likely or whether additional features in the control and protection system are needed to protect against such consequences.
Power measurements over the test period indicate that the turbine system exhibited control over power production in response to high winds. Both 1-minute average power data and 1-second maximum power data in Figure 3 show a leveling in wind speeds greater than about 12 m/s to 13 m/s. Furthermore, the turbine automatically shuts down if the average wind speed over 10 minutes is at least 20 m/s, and on occurrence of an instantaneous reading of at least 25 m/s.
Rotor-Speed Control
Rotor-speed measurements over the test period indicate that the turbine system exhibits control over rotor speed in response to high winds. Figure 4 shows both 1-minute average and 1-second maximum rotor speed. The maxima level off and hold at about 63 rpm. The manufacturer's rated rotor speed is 60 rpm and a rotor over speed occurs at 66 rpm. The data shows the rotor speed was held at less than 66 rpm.
Yaw Orientation
NREL staff observed yaw behavior frequently during the test period and compared yaw position with the nearby wind-vane indication of wind direction. Normal behavior was observed under all operating wind conditions. The turbine has cables that run from the nacelle through the tower and does not use slip rings. A test for simulating the turbine's response to twisted power and instrumentation cables is provided elsewhere in this section.
Start-Up
Normal Operation-Wind Speed Greater Than Cut-In. This event was captured in January 2009. As shown in Figure 5 , the wind speeds were slightly greater than the cut-in wind speed, so the turbine started from the "soft starter." This is indicated by the negative power spikes that occurred before starting. During the turbine motoring pulses, the rotor speed increased and the turbine began producing power in wind speeds of approximately 4 m/s. NREL staff observed similar smooth cut-ins when the turbine was returned to service after shutdown.
Normal Operation-Wind Speed Decreasing to Less Than Cut-Out. This event was documented in November 2008. Figure 6 shows the turbine shutting down due to an instantaneous wind-speed reading of more than 25 m/s as the rotor speed and power fall to zero. After approximately 20 minutes the wind speeds decreased and turbine auto-started without error.
After Maintenance or Fault Clearance at Design Wind Speed (10.5 m/s) or Greater. This event occurred in January 2009. The "emergency-stop" button on the side of the controller box was pressed, activating the mechanical brake to stop the turbine. The error was cleared manually and the turbine started without problem. Figure 9 shows a time series of the events.
Normal Shutdown
Normal Operation-Wind Speed Decreasing to Less Than Cut-In. This event was captured in January 2009. When the wind speed decreases to less than cut-in the turbine stops producing power-with no significant change in sound or behavior. The turbine allows the rotor to freewheel in wind speeds less than cut-in. Figure 7 shows that the turbine stopped producing power and slowed to a stop as the wind speed decreased. Behavior Upon Automatic Shutdown from Over Speed at Design Wind Speed or Greater. This event was observed in January 2009. While the turbine was operating, the setting for maximum rotor speed temporarily was changed to 59 rpm (normally 66 rpm). As soon as the setting was changed, the mechanical brake brought the wind turbine to a stop and the controller read, "rotor over speed." The wind speeds were between 7 m/s and 15 m/s.
Behavior Upon Automatic Shutdown from Generator Average Overcharge at Design Wind Speed or Greater. This event was captured in January 2009. If the average power for a 10-minute period is greater than the controller setting, the turbine shuts down. To simulate this event, the setting in the controller was changed from 15 kW to 2 kW. After the setting change, the turbine's mechanical brake was applied and the controller read, "(G) power too high." It was confirmed through the data that the average power for the 10 minutes prior to shutdown was greater than 2 kW. The wind speeds were between 12 m/s and 14 m/s at the time of the test.
Behavior Upon Excessive Vibration
The event was observed in February 2009. For this event, the mechanical brake was released and the vibration sensor in the turbine's nacelle was toggled manually. The mechanical brake was reapplied in response to the event and the controller read, "vibration error." The wind speeds were less than 5 m/s during this event.
Behavior Upon Loss of Load
Response to Grid Outage. This event was observed in January 2009. The disconnect switch in the data shed was opened to simulate a grid outage and the turbine stopped within 2 to 3 seconds. After the switch was opened, the turbine voltage increased to 560 V before dropping to 0 V. The wind speed was between 9 m/s and 10 m/s and the turbine was producing approximately 11 kW. Figure 10 
Turbine-Specific Checks
Behavior Upon Rotor Over speed 10%. This event was documented in August 2009. The maximum value for rotor speed setting in the controller was temporarily changed from the standard 66 rpm to 50 rpm. The setting was changed while the turbine was parked. Figure 11 shows the turbine's rotor speed increase from 0 rpm to approximately 49 rpm when the brake was applied. The turbine came to a complete stop approximately 3 seconds after the brake was applied. The controller read, "rotor over speed." The wind speeds were between 4 m/s and 6 m/s.
Behavior Upon Rotor Over speed 15%. This event was captured in May 2008. In case of a mechanical brake failure, the increased centripetal force causes the tip brakes to deploy at a rotor speed of approximately 15% greater than the nominal rotations per minute-or 69 rpm-to aerodynamically stop the turbine. The rotor over speed 10% setting was increased to allow the tip brakes to deploy. One tip brake was deployed less than 1 second after the turbine reached 69 rpm. Figure 12 shows that the turbine came to a complete stop approximately 42 seconds after the tip brake was deployed. The wind speeds were between 2 m/s and 6 m/s.
Behavior Upon Generator Instantaneous Overcharge. This event occurred in August 2009. The instantaneous generator overcharge setting temporarily was changed from 18 kW to 2 kW while the turbine was parked. Figure 13 shows the turbine shut down when the power exceeded 2 kW. The controller read, "(G) peak power." The wind speeds were between 2 m/s and 7 m/s.
Behavior Upon Generator Average Overcharge. This event was observed in January 2009. The average generator overcharge setting for 10 minutes was changed from 15 kW to 6 kW. The turbine's mechanical brake was applied instantly and the controller read, "(G) power too high." It was confirmed through the data that, at the time the brake was applied, the average power for the prior 10 minutes was greater than 6 kW. The wind speeds were between 7 m/s and 17 m/s.
Behavior Upon Cable Twist. This event was observed in February 2009. The cables from the turbine nacelle are looped through a ring at the end of the cable twist arm. Excessive winding causes the cables to turn the ring and subsequently lift the cable twist arm. In this event, a sensor at the end of the cable twist arm is activated. While the turbine was parked, the cable twist arm located at the base of the tower was lifted to simulate a twisted cable. The controller error read, "cable twisted." In the case of an actual twisted cable, a service engineer from Gaia-Wind must unwind the cables. NREL staff did not attempt to manually twist the cables or to unwind them.
Personnel Safety Provisions Safety Instructions
The turbine has three separate manuals-an installation manual, a user's manual, and a service manual. Generally, the installation and service manuals are used only by trained personnel and are not provided to the turbine owner. The user's manual states that only trained personnel should service or perform maintenance on their turbines, and safety requirements for the personnel are listed. The installation and service manuals list additional requirements for trained personnel regarding personal protective equipment, climbing, electrical work, mechanical maintenance, and wind conditions. All manuals include safety reminders and references throughout.
NREL staff checked the manuals to determine whether the safety instructions addressed requirements in accordance with the IEC small turbine design standard. NREL staff found the following.
Disengage the load and/or energy sources: An isolation switch labeled "main switch" is located on the left-hand side of the controller box, although the user manual does not specifically indicate the location of this switch. The switch is shown in Figure 15 .
Stop and secure the rotor: The service manual contained instructions on how to apply the brake the turbine from the controller and how to secure the rotor from the working basket.
Stop and secure the yaw mechanism: An anchor bolt is provided for locking the nacelle; this task must be performed from the working basket. Brief instructions on securing the yaw are given in the installation manual and the service manual.
Climb tower: The installation manual and service manual include descriptions of personal protective equipment that should be used when climbing the ladder, and also give some general guidelines. No manual includes specific instructions for climbing the tower or transitioning between the tower and the working basket.
Climbing
A ladder is attached to the turbine tower, and NREL personnel climbed using a point-to-point lanyard method. The nacelle manually must be yawed for workers to transition from the tower to the working basket. The yaw only can be locked from the working basket, therefore the transition to the basket can be difficult in wind speeds that are strong enough to yaw the turbine. The working basket can be entered from the tower through the bottom of the basket by lifting up one half of the platform and pushing it over the other half. There are nonstrengthened tie-off points inside the working basket. Exiting from the platform to the ladder presents a potential safety risk in that the turbine could yaw while personnel are exiting. Additionally, it might be difficult to manually yaw the turbine so that the working basket is facing the ladder.
Standing Places, Platforms, and Floors
The standing platform in the working basket is not secured through a lock or latch, and instead relies on gravitational pull to keep it in place. The platform in the working basket is a nonslip surface. To slide the platform back into place after entering the basket, however, NREL personnel had to stand on the working basket rails. The rails are not a nonslip surface and present a potential safety hazard.
Electrical and Grounding System
The power cables are exposed from the turbine tower to the controller where they terminate at a socket. The exposed cable presents a potential trip hazard, as shown in Figure 16 . The socket termination shown in Figure 17 presents a potential safety hazard because it can be unplugged while the turbine is running. The grounding system consists of four ground rods embedded in the foundation and connected with a ground wire. The ground wire is connected to the tower and the turbine controller.
Emergency-Stop Button
The turbine has an emergency-stop button on the outside of the controller box, but it is not labeled. This button is used whenever the turbine must be shut down manually. Located on the outside of the controller box is a main switch for disconnecting the turbine from the grid; this switch is labeled "main switch." Figure 15 shows both the emergency-stop button and the main switch.
Lock-Out/Tag-Out Provisions NREL provided a lockable switch between the grid and the turbine controller. The manufacturer does not provide this equipment or recommend that this type of equipment be installed.
Interlock on Electrical Cabinets
The controller does not have an interlock but it must be opened with a key provided by GaiaWind. This provides some protection from unauthorized access.
Safety Signs
Neither the turbine nor the controller had any warning signs affixed. NREL personnel labeled the controller, electrical panels, and disconnects, indicating the voltage levels of each.
Presence and Functioning of Rotor Lock and Yaw Lock
The turbine locks the rotor with a mechanical brake which can be activated using the controller, the emergency-stop button, the main switch, or a disconnect switch. The yaw mechanism can be secured from the working basket by installing an anchor bolt in the nacelle.
Unauthorized Changing of Control Settings
The controller settings are password-protected. There are two levels of access, one allows a user to view the turbine status and to reset user errors, and another level permits trained personnel to change settings and to reset external errors. To prevent the changing of the control settings or the resetting of external errors, users generally are not given the password for the higher-level access.
Lighting Protection
The turbine tower and controller are connected to a ground electrode intended to serve as lightning protection. During the test period no direct or nearby lightning strikes were observed.
Dynamic Behavior
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Deviations and Exceptions
Deviations from the Standard There were no known exceptions to the standard, IEC 61400-2, for the test.
Exceptions to the NWTC Quality Assurance System
The data acquisition modules were used beyond the calibration due date. The modules were post-test calibrated and found to be in compliance within the specifications. Appendix A includes the post-test calibration sheets. 
